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Abstract
Over the course of its existence, The Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has impacted how
the international community regulates nuclear
weapon technology. With over 190 party states,
the NPT has ensured the dismantlement of 50,000
nuclear weapons around the world. Although
the NPT has led to a great deal of progress,
a shift has occurred in non-proliferation efforts
within the last ten years. Nuclear-weapon states
party to the NPT have halted further disarma-
ment of their nuclear arsenals and funded mod-
ernization programs for their remaining stock-
piles which have heightened concerns among non-
nuclear party and nuclear non-party states. It
has also called into question the relevancy of the
NPT. The purpose of this paper is to determine the
NPT’s influence on the international community
today by examining whether the treaty encourages
nuclear weapon party states to disarm further?
Whether the NPT is driving non-nuclear party
states like Japan and Brazil away from nuclear
weapons? And whether the NPT can motivate Is-
rael, India, Pakistan, and North Korea from nu-
clear weapons, specifically when external threats
incline them towards a nuclear option? Analyzing
each case study, it is evident that the NPT has little
to no influence on whether a state obtains nuclear
weapons. Threats to national security are the crit-
ical factor as consistent with the realist school of
thought.
1. Introduction
In 1970, the international community enacted
The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with the mis-
sion to end the creation and spread of nuclear
weapons and promote the peaceful usage of nu-
clear energy (Treaty). Since the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombings, the international community
has made nuclear power regulation a top priority
(Review Conference). With over 190 party states,
five of which are nuclear weapons states, the NPT
represents one of the few international efforts to-
ward nuclear non-proliferation and complete dis-
armament (Treaty).
The NPT is among the most prominent nuclear
arms treaties. In the past 47 years, the NPT has
directed states towards addressing nuclear arms,
leading to the dismantlement of over 50,000 nu-
clear weapons (Kristensen). However, how the
NPT has shaped the international community and
its system remains contested. Since 1970, states
have either increased or decreased their stockpiles,
while some have promised not to gain weapons at
all. Although the treaty has not changed, its influ-
ence on a state’s decision to arm has. This leads
one to consider whether a world free of nuclear
war threats is achievable under the NPT?
Some scholars argue that the NPT is the only
way the world can avoid nuclear war while others
believe the treaty has promoted a hierarchical sys-
tem where only certain states have permission to
explore their nuclear capabilities. To understand
why countries continue to preserve, advance, or
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refrain from nuclear arms use, this paper will con-
sider: how has the NPT influenced nuclear party,
non-nuclear party, and nuclear non-party states?
Why are states increasing their stockpiles? Why
are nuclear party states refusing to disarm further?
Does the NPT prevent countries from pursuing nu-
clear weapons, specifically when external threats
incline them to do so?
2. History
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for
Peace” proposal initiated international efforts to-
wards nuclear proliferation (Review Conference).
His call to disarm and dismantle nuclear weapon
technology led to the creation of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since 1957, the
IAEA has regulated the use of nuclear technology
by the international community via the safeguard
systems (Review Conference). The safeguards en-
sure that countries comply with the goals and reg-
ulations of the NPT by passing inspections admin-
istered by the agency (Treaty).
Since the establishment of the NPT, nuclear
weapons declined from about 70,000 to 14,000
in 2017 (Kristensen). These reductions were
a result of proliferation agreements reached by
the international community (Kristensen). The
NPT continues to strengthen its provisions ev-
ery five years through considerable review how-
ever several conferences, including those in 1980,
1990, 1995, and 2005, could not reach an agree-
ment. Many states remained conflicted over how
much progress the nuclear party states–United
States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Rus-
sia–made towards complete disarmament (Review
Conference). This is problematic because the
treaty requires parties to disarm at an “early date”
(Duarte 3).
In addition, states like Israel, Pakistan, India,
and North Korea remain disengaged from nuclear
non-proliferation efforts, continuing to possess
nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon states such
as Iraq, Libya, and Iran have also tried to acquire
nuclear weapons, violating regulations set forth by
the treaty and the IAEA. Many non-nuclear states
find their ability to gain technologies able to pro-
duce fissile materials to be an “inalienable right”
(4). They believe the safeguards constrain their
ability for peaceful nuclear activities. In addition,
these states argue that regulation between the non-
nuclear states and the nuclear-weapon state parties
is disproportionate (4).
3. Literature Review
Various schools of thought have analyzed and
interpreted the NPT’s influence on the interna-
tional community, and its system. Exploring the
perspectives and methodologies of realists, liber-
als, and constructivists have led to several con-
clusions about the NPT. Realists argue that the
NPT functions as a tool by dominant states such
as the U.S. and Russia to preserve their control
over nuclear weaponry while restricting the abil-
ity of other states to this same control (Petersen
24). Liberals view the NPT as a tool to protect
the world from the potential destruction nuclear
weapons can cause. They also argue the treaty
reshapes the way leaders view state security and
nuclear weaponry (26). Constructivists perceive
the NPT as a social construct that establishes or-
der within the international community (43).
The realist argument that the NPT is a means
for superpowers to exercise their control stems
from fundamental realist beliefs. A core premise
in realist and classical realist theory is that states
are rational actors looking to maximize their self-
interest, which includes maintaining national se-
curity (Nel 27). The history of nuclear weapons
has brought about the “security dilemma” which
causes insecurity among states in the international
community (Ikenberry 14). As a state equips it-
self with nuclear weaponry, other states feel inse-
cure and acquire their own nuclear arms. Evident
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, this leads
to proliferation (14). States like the U.S., the So-
viet Union, and the U.K. realized that the spread
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of nuclear weapons could destroy the control these
superpowers have over their allies (Tertrais 1).
To avoid this, international treaties, like the NPT,
were created by the will of these superpowers,
since dismantling nuclear arsenals would not re-
flect the rational thinking states possess (Carranza
493 and Allison 12). Therefore, the NPT was, and
is, intended for these powers to maintain control
over their weapons and prevent others from gain-
ing their own (12).
Scholars have concluded that nations, espe-
cially great powers, obtain nuclear weapons for
multiple reasons. One of which involves nations
emulating the weaponry of other nations to op-
pose them (Waltz). Another reason is that nations
will build their own arsenals out of fear that their
stronger allies will not protect them if they face
nuclear threats from enemies. This was the reality
in Great Britain when they feared the U.S. would
not protect them from the Soviet Union’s threats.
Another reason a nation will gain nuclear weapons
is if their adversaries also gain weapons, or out
of fear of their future capabilities. In addition,
countries find that nuclear weapons are a cheaper
alternative than conventional arms and can solid-
ify their international standing (Waltz). Realist
scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, even argue that a
world where nuclear arms are available to all will
lead to a peaceful world. Waltz reaches this con-
clusion by asserting that states discourage one an-
other from using nuclear weapons out of fear of
the devastation it will cause (Waltz). Therefore, if
all states have nuclear capabilities, and deterrence
strategies fail, then these countries will avoid go-
ing to war out of fear of a nuclear catastrophe
(Waltz). This was clear during the Cold War when
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union realized that
going to war meant immeasurable losses on both
sides. Knowledge of nuclear weapons along with
fear enabled both parties to come to a solution (Al-
lison 136).
Liberal perspectives on the NPT center on the
core belief that a state’s best interest is to pursue
the common good (Petersen 131). Liberals argue
that the NPT is reducing nuclear proliferation. In
addition, by following the NPT, states can focus
on their national security (131). Since Carr and
other liberals believe the international community
has a moral obligation to one another, treaties are
an effective form of governance because of the
element of cooperation it requires from all states
(147). Evans and Kawaguchi show this claim by
citing the 189 member states and South Africa’s
dismantling of their nuclear weapons (78). Since
member states acknowledge “... nuclear weapons
are simply wrong”, the moral aspect of NPT
should not be underestimated (78). Liberals view
the NPT as a rational way for states to ensure their
security by eliminating nuclear weapons.
In addition, liberals argue that economic costs
stopped the U.S. and the Soviet Union from go-
ing to war. Liberals note that the amount of
money spent on creating nuclear weapons, and,
funding delivery vehicles and other transportation
systems are in the billions (128). Therefore, go-
ing to nuclear war is not a rational decision be-
cause of the economic costs invested in creating
and maintaining the weapons. Liberals reference
Germany, Japan, Belarus, South Africa, Ukraine,
and other states that have removed their nuclear
weapons or passed on the opportunity to create
nuclear weapons. These states show that having
this weaponry is unnecessary for national security,
nor is it a requirement for rational states, or those
working in their self-interest (129).
The constructivist perspective on the NPT fo-
cuses on how the treaty has formed as a means for
international governance (158). Constructivism
analyzes how ideas and beliefs shape state be-
havior and how other states react to that behavior
(158). Through documents like the NPT, the in-
ternational community can create new norms and
standards for itself by reestablishing the commu-
nity’s behavior. This occurs when leaders come
together to decide and define what is and is not ac-
ceptable (159). For the NPT, this occurs every five
years at the review conferences. There, they draw
new provisions, discuss issues, and create resolu-
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tions, reshaping what the NPT means to both the
international community and the individual mem-
ber states.
An example of this constructivist concept is
Egypt’s admission into the NPT. Egypt’s interest
in nuclear technology stemmed from insecurities
brought forth by Israel’s nuclear activity (Bakanic
18). Egypt tried to move forward with nuclear pro-
grams, and appeal to India and the Soviet Union
for assistance; however, these attempts were un-
successful. In 1981, Egypt joined the NPT (Gre-
gory 22). Egyptian leaders agreed that joining the
NPT would mean greater benefits than the status
associated with having nuclear weapons (Rublee
147). This is clear from the strong US-Egypt rela-
tions and contributions of over $2 billion in aid
provided per year (Petersen 161). In addition,
Egypt can criticize Israel’s vague nuclear activity
and be a leader in the region. The shift from seek-
ing security and stature via nuclear weaponry to
joining the NPT and combating Israel shows how
the NPT has altered the state’s identity, interests,
and behaviors (162).
The stark contrast between each school of
thought illustrates the dividing perspectives on
the NPT’s ability to achieve non-proliferation and
complete disarmament. By analyzing the method-
ologies, the realist approach relies on the initial
formation of the treaty and the power structure
among states, while the liberalist approach re-
quires a look at today’s involvement among mem-
ber states. The constructivist perspective has a
more fluid interpretation of the purpose and func-
tion of the NPT, which alters as leaders come to-
gether–via international conferences–to discuss it.
4. Methodology
Regardless of how each school of thought an-
alyzes the NPT, valid arguments are present on
each side. These arguments give way to a bet-
ter understanding of the successes and shortfalls
of the treaty. Understanding the influence of the
NPT on the international community requires an
analysis of nuclear party, non-nuclear party, and
nuclear non-party weapon states. This paper will
examine nuclear party states such as the United
States, U.K., France, Russia, and China, and how
the NPT has influenced their decisions to decrease
their nuclear stockpiles. It will also explore how
these states maintain their remaining weapons and
the effect this has on the international commu-
nity. The following research will also analyze
whether the NPT influences non-nuclear weapon
states like Japan and Brazil, against gaining nu-
clear weapons. Last, this paper will expand upon
the NPT’s relationship with nuclear non-party
states like Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Ko-
rea. Within this point, further analysis will de-
termine whether the NPT can discourage, or even
prevent, countries facing external threats from ac-
quiring nuclear weapons.
5. Case Studies: Nuclear - Weapon State Par-
ties
The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state party
as a state that has “manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
prior to January 1, 1967” (Treaty 1968). These
countries include the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, China, and Russia (Review
Conference).
The treaty states that signers of the document
believe there are benefits to the peaceful nuclear
technology that states create, which include the
byproducts that come with nuclear explosive de-
vices. Therefore, nuclear technology should be
available to all states regardless of whether they
are a nuclear or non-nuclear weapon state party
(Treaty 1968). The NPT contains several re-
quirements for nuclear-weapon states. The treaty
prohibits nuclear-weapon state parties from trans-
ferring nuclear weapons, devices, and, control
of such items to non-nuclear states. Article I
also prohibits states from encouraging or assist-
ing non-nuclear weapon states in engineering such
weapons. Article VI of the treaty asks that each
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party pursue negotiations, and create an efficient
means to reach nuclear disarmament at “an early
date,” and a treaty on complete disarmament un-
der international control. In addition, the NPT re-
quires the votes of all nuclear-weapon state parties
in order to approve an amendment (Treaty 1968).
Of the 14,930 nuclear warheads remaining,
about 9,400 are in military stockpiles (Kris-
tensen). Over 3,900 are deployed with operational
forces belonging to the British and French, how-
ever, about 93% of these weapons belong to Rus-
sia and the U.S. About 1,800 are ready to launch
at a moment’s notice. Although the number of nu-
clear weapons has decreased since 1986, (about
55,400 weapons reduction) many argue that the
rate at which these countries are disarming has
slowed in the last 25 years. In addition, all the
nuclear weapon states appear to be keeping their
remaining stockpiles and undergoing moderniza-
tion programs to revolutionize them (Kristensen).
The U.S., U.K., Russia, France, and China cre-
ated nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The
U.S. did so as an inexpensive and proactive ap-
proach to Russian aggression during that time.
Not only did the bombings of Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki end WWII, but it also sent a message to
Russia of U.S capabilities. This sparked Russia’s
urgency to produce their own nuclear weapons,
initiating what scholars call the nuclear arms race.
Britain, France, and China developed their own
nuclear weapons programs, refusing to rely on the
U.S. and Russia for security from a nuclear threat.
By 1986, the world held about 70,300 nu-
clear weapons (Kristensen). The NPT led to a
major disarmament among these nations, with a
total reduction of about 55,000 nuclear weapons
(Kristensen). A majority of this reduction oc-
curred during the 1990s when fear of nuclear war
was a major concern (Kristensen). Today’s re-
duction rate has slowed with many leaders re-
fusing to dismantle their nuclear stockpiles com-
pletely. In a 2015 U.S. State Department report,
the U.S. found that Russia violated The U.S.’s
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
claiming they tested a ground-launched cruise
missile (Reif). According to a NATO report, Rus-
sia has also performed simulated nuclear attacks
on NATO allies and partners, such as Sweden, in
March 2013 (Nato 15). In addition, Russia’s Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin expressed his perspective on
nuclear arms. In 2000, he adopted a military doc-
trine that allowed Russia to use nuclear weapons
against those who present “large-scale aggression
utilizing conventional weapons in situations crit-
ical to the national security of the Russian Fed-
eration” (Russia’s Military). This is a dramatic
change in Russia’s former policy, which had for-
bidden Russia from being the first to use nuclear
weapons (Russia’s Military).
President Putin is not the only leader who has
presented such controversial policies. In 1978, the
U.K. policy assured the international community
the country would not use or threaten to use nu-
clear weapons against non-nuclear state parties,
unless an attack was committed against the U.K.,
its territories, military, or allies, by a non-nuclear
state party with help from a nuclear-weapon state
(Kristensen 2011 93). Then in 1995, the U.K.
broadened this policy to include any invasion or
attack on any state that the U.K. possessed a secu-
rity commitment with (93). The country’s Strate-
gic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) in 2010
stated that although the UK faces no threat from
nuclear-states, they could still refer to this policy if
a future threat of attack occurred, leaving room for
potential conflict among the U.K. and non-nuclear
state parties (94).
Policies toward maintaining and using nuclear
weapons are only half the issue. These nuclear
weapon states are also working towards modern-
izing their remaining stockpiles. In 2010, the U.K.
released the number of warheads in its arsenal to
the public, announcing plans to shrink its stockpile
from 160 to 120 (90). As of 2017, the U.K. still
has 215 weapons (Kristensen). This number en-
compasses weapons in military stockpiles, those
that are retired, and those that ‘will be’ disman-
tled. The U.K.’s stockpile can arguably be con-
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sidered the smallest of the five states (Kristensen
2011 91). However, the U.K. has also admitted
to preserving some of its nuclear weaponry. In its
SDSR, the U.K. explained that it remains focused
on renewing its nuclear deterrent force to protect
itself from the current “age of uncertainty” (Secur-
ing Britain). Although the UK has renounced its
biological and chemical weapons programs from
the Cold War, the country still has a highly de-
veloped missile program that continues to mature
(United Kingdom).
The U.K. has also joined forces with France,
in terms of security and defense (Kristensen 2011
93). Through bilateral treaties, these countries are
working to maintain and develop their respective
nuclear arsenals (93). The French government is
not, yet, planning a future reduction of their nu-
clear weapons (Kristensen, 2015 30). The coun-
try spends approximately 3.6-4.6 billion U.S. dol-
lars annually on nuclear forces (Acheson). The
French President Francois Hollande announced
that 12.3% of that budget would fund nuclear
weapon modernization (France Nuclear). This
includes modernizing submarines, aircrafts, war-
heads, and nuclear facilities (Kristensen 2015 30).
Hollande plans to continue this funding until 2019
(France Nuclear). In addition, France is also look-
ing into the study of next-generation weaponry
(Kristensen 2015 30). The country’s interest in
maintaining their current nuclear weapons arsenal,
while modernizing such a technology, contrasts
with the obligations imposed by the NPT to dis-
mantle nuclear weaponry.
What began in 1970 as a major motivator for
these superpowers to disarm is now irrelevant. Af-
ter decades of disarmament, the superpowers are
now slowing their reduction and modernizing their
stockpiles. The reason for this is twofold. First,
relations today between countries are like that of
the Cold War. U.S.-Russia relations have reached
serious lows comparable to that of the 1940s. This
results from U.S.-Russia aggressions towards each
other from nuclear weapons disputes, the Syria
crisis, U.S. allegations of Russian election hack-
ing and more. Both the U.S. and Russia do not
trust each other, in fact, officials in the Russian
Defense Ministry have admitted that the Obama
Administration’s pursuit of a world free of nuclear
weapons is an attempt to dominate with conven-
tional weapons (Shuster). The five superpowers
are working to maintain what is left of their stock-
piles because they are certain that others are doing
the same.
The second reason for the superpowers slowed
dismantlement and innovation is that the NPT
does not discuss modernization. Although Article
VI of the treaty requires the U.S., the U.K., Russia,
France, and China to work towards the disman-
tlement of stockpiles and “pursue negotiations in
good faith” at an “early date,” there are no limita-
tions to modernize weapons (Treaty 1968) (Kris-
tensen 2014 106-107). In the 2015 review con-
ference, many non-nuclear state parties pointed
to the nuclear state’s expensive and counterpro-
ductive modernization programs, nuclear policies,
and slow disarmament pace, as evidence for con-
cerns of serious penalties (Arms Control Experts).
However, the vagueness of the NPT and persis-
tence of nuclear parties has led to strong disagree-
ment (Arms Control Experts).
The NPT functioned to de-escalate tensions
caused by the Cold War. These countries were
fearful of the mutually assured destruction that
would come from a nuclear war. The NPT was
a way for these powers to reduce their stockpiles
with an assurance that other nuclear-armed coun-
tries were doing the same. However, the intention
to maintain nuclear stockpiles, regardless of NPT
obligations, has resulted in its preservation by all
five-weapon states. As Waltz describes, countries
will gain nuclear weapons to retaliate against other
countries that have gained them, as evidenced by
Russia and the U.S. (Waltz). Countries will also
equip themselves out of fear of uncertainty and re-
fusal to rely on other states like Britain, China, and
France, for protection.
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6. Case Studies: Non-Nuclear - Weapon State
Parties
Party states that signed the NPT and have not
manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon de-
vice prior to January 1, 1967, are called non-
nuclear weapon state parties. There are over 180
non-nuclear weapon state parties, all of which
are located in various regions around the world
(Treaty). Under the NPT, these parties cannot re-
ceive or have control over nuclear weapons and
similar explosive devices (Treaty 1968). These
states cannot seek or receive help to produce
weapons. In addition, each non-nuclear weapon
state party is to accept the safeguards negoti-
ated with the IAEA to remain in compliance with
the NPT’s requirements and to remain within the
bounds of peaceful nuclear activity (Treaty 1968).
However, many non-nuclear state parties can ac-
quire nuclear weapons. For example, Brazil and
Japan have the technological and economic re-
sources to do so; however, they have chosen not
to gain these weapons. Whether this results from
obligations imposed on them by the NPT, is worth
consideration.
Brazil’s nuclear program first began in the
1930s (Brazil’s Nuclear). Motivated by the mil-
itary regimes that dominated Brazil between 1964
and 1985, the program primarily focused on ura-
nium enrichment (Brazil’s Nuclear). Eventually,
every branch of Brazil’s military had their own nu-
clear weapons program (Marvin). Their pursuit
of nuclear weapons was due to a longstanding ri-
valry between Brazil and Argentina (Brazil’s Nu-
clear). Their ambitions toward regional influence
and recognition within the international commu-
nity ignited the contention. In 1967, Brazil signed
the Treaty of Tlatelolco making Latin America a
nuclear-free zone. However, limitations in nuclear
activity were not set forth until 1988 when Brazil
approved a new constitution restricting their use of
nuclear activities to peaceful purposes only. Over
time, the competition between both Brazil and Ar-
gentina diminished because of democratization.
Eventually, the two states signed an agreement
pledging to maintain peaceful nuclear activities.
In 1998, Brazil became a party of the NPT; how-
ever, the country’s participation in the treaty oc-
curred much later due to hesitation from Brazil’s
leaders. They believed the NPT was a means for
foreign forces to control and hinder Brazil’s nu-
clear objectives. Leaders like President Lula Da
Silva believed signing the treaty would be detri-
mental, considering the possibility of conflict be-
tween Brazil and a nuclear power (Brazil’s Nu-
clear).
Since their signing of the NPT, Brazil’s nu-
clear weapons programs have ended. Their cur-
rent goal is to reach self-sufficiency in selling nu-
clear fuel to the international market (Brazil’s Nu-
clear). Today, Brazil has the most advanced nu-
clear facilities in Latin America and works to up-
hold nuclear weapon states to their nuclear disar-
mament obligations set forth by the NPT (Country
Profiles). Although Brazil appears to have shifted
from a critic to an advocate of the NPT, the real
motivator behind Brazil’s refusal to acquire nu-
clear weapons is that it does not have a reason
to. Unlike nuclear weapon states, such as the U.S.
and Russia, or nuclear non-party states, such as
Pakistan and India, Brazil does not face a serious
security dilemma (Marvin). Brazil’s push for nu-
clear weapons in the 1930s derived from the tense
relations and rivalry with Argentina. Brazil along
with Argentina and Chile have had their own nu-
clear arms race. However, similar to the allies and
Russia, the fear of mutually assured destruction
pushed them towards disarmament. The democra-
tization of the countries helped to diffuse the ten-
sion between Brazil and Argentina and the Treaty
of Tlatelolco provided an “out” that was prefer-
able to the NPT at the time (Marvin). Today,
Brazil does not face serious threats to its security.
Regardless of its ability to get nuclear weaponry,
it is the low-security threat that drives Brazil away
from nuclear weapons, not the NPT.
Another non-nuclear weapon state with the in-
telligence and financial resources to possess nu-
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clear weapons is Japan. Japan’s non-nuclear pol-
icy stance derives from its devastating history in
the Cold War, specifically the Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki bombings (Japan). The country has never
developed a complete nuclear weapons program;
rather, it has implemented anti-nuclear weapons
policies. These policies restrict Japan’s use of
nuclear activity to peaceful purposes and forbid
the manufacturing, possession, or transportation
of nuclear weapons in Japan. The country became
an official signatory of the NPT in 1968. Similar
to Brazil, Japanese leaders had their reservations
towards the NPT. Leaders were concerned that it
would hinder the country from achieving national
energy needs through nuclear technology. Others
worried it would be detrimental to Japan’s security
(Japan).
Since its signing, Japan has remained a leader
in the fight towards a nuclear-free world. In
fact, the country has reached out to non-nuclear
weapon states like Canada, Mexico, the United
Arab Emirates, and Poland, to advance nuclear
disarmament and nonproliferation efforts (Japan).
Even the country’s public shares serious anti-
nuclear weapons attitudes. Nevertheless, the
country has undergone recent nuclearization de-
bates fueled by the tensions in the Korean penin-
sula (Japan). In October 2006, North Korea con-
ducted a nuclear weapons test, which caused many
of Japan’s top officials to question a Japanese nu-
clear arsenal (Hughes). Officials argued that Japan
may constitutionally possess nuclear weapons for
the exclusive purpose of self-defense (Hughes).
Many scholars argue that Japan is too vested in
its commitment to nonproliferation to develop nu-
clear weapons (Japan).
Whether the NPT will continue to hold Japan
from acquiring nuclear weapons is debatable.
Although Japan is consistent in its anti-nuclear
weapons stance, perhaps this results from Japan’s
low-level security threats, and was it to have a
threat to security, may alter this stance. Over the
years, the Japanese government has maintained a
relaxed response to events many would find con-
cerning like China’s nuclear test in 1964, the So-
viet Union during the Cold War, and North Ko-
rea’s nuclear efforts today (Hughes). Japan can
maintain this composure, with North Korea, be-
cause it does not consider it a high-security threat.
The Japanese government believes that North Ko-
rea would require more time, beyond their first
test, to develop the nuclear weapons they desired.
This leaves more time for the Japanese to pursue
diplomatic negotiations. Second, Japan’s initial
response to North Korean nuclear threats would
be an acceleration in their ballistic defense sys-
tems (Hughes). Further, Japan’s reliance on the
U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is also a major
reason for their relaxed approach (Japan). Their
reliance began in 2013 when Japan created a na-
tional security strategy against North Korea. This
strategy consists of Japan’s ballistic missile de-
fense and increased cooperation in extended de-
terrence with the U.S. This commitment has en-
sured Japan’s security making it easier for Japan
to worry less about nuclear threats, and more on
nonproliferation (Japan).
In addition, the security risks from Japan’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons will far outweigh the
benefits. While Japan may protect itself by work-
ing towards nuclear capabilities, their possession
of nuclear weapons can cause an arms race be-
tween itself, China, and North Korea (Hughes).
This security dilemma is not in the interest of the
Japanese or the U.S., and any potential for the
U.S. to not provide deterrence after Japan’s nu-
clear weapon possession would be detrimental to
Japan’s security. Although Japan is among those
at the forefront of progressive nonproliferation ef-
forts, its decision to abide by the treaty is because
it faces no national security threats. If the threat
posed by North Korea reached a state of serious
concern to Japan, it will welcome U.S. nuclear
arms into the country as it did in Okinawa in 1969
(Japan).
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7. Case Studies: Nuclear Non-Party States
Nuclear non-party states are those that have
not signed the NPT and pursue nuclear weapons.
They include Israel, India, and Pakistan. North
Korea also falls in this category as it was a signer;
however, it has since opted to possess nuclear
weapons, therefore violating the treaty. Each of
these countries began their nuclear weapons pro-
grams within a decade of each other. Israel is
the first country in the Middle East to possess nu-
clear weapons beginning its pursuit in the 1950s
(Israel Nuclear). Israel sought nuclear weaponry
to ease the threat posed by its neighbors. In ad-
dition, the U.S.’s “abandonment” of Israel during
the Suez Canal, solidified Israel’s pursuit of a self-
sustained nuclear deterrence. Maintaining a sense
of secrecy, it is unknown the exact size of Israel’s
nuclear weapons or specifics on its biological and
chemical weapons programs. Although Israel is
not a signer of the NPT, the country maintains that
it is interested in a nuclear-free Middle East, with
the caveat that comprehensive peace is essential
before such talks can occur (Israel Nuclear).
India’s exploration of nuclear weapons began
in the 1940s with an actual program developed in
the 1960s (India). From 1997 to 2009, the coun-
try developed a chemical weapons program. Af-
ter completing five tests in 1998, the country de-
clared itself a nuclear weapon state. In 2005, the
U.S. collaborated with India allowing them into
the international nuclear market as long as they
abided by specific safeguards. As of 2015, In-
dia’s nuclear arsenal is comprised of 90 to 110
warheads. India remains a non-signer of the NPT
for multiple reasons. For one, India’s leaders be-
lieve the NPT maintains an unfair distinction be-
tween the nuclear weapon states and the rest of
the world. The treaty allows these states to possess
nuclear weapons while enforcing strict restrictions
on non-nuclear states. In addition, India is critical
of the nuclear-weapon state’s disarmament efforts.
Since the NPT’s inception, nuclear-weapon states
have yet to achieve the obligations set forth in Ar-
ticle IV of the treaty (India).
Pakistan began its nuclear weapons programs
in the 1970s following the Indo-Pakistani War
(Pakistan). Pakistan’s desire to curb the con-
ventional inferiority against India motivated such
efforts. Following India’s tests, Pakistan began
its own trials focusing on uranium enrichment.
Eventually, the country declared itself a nuclear
weapon state. Since then, Pakistan refuses to sign
the NPT in addition to a majority of other anti-
nuclear arms treaties (Pakistan).
North Korea has pushed for its own nuclear
weapons program since the end of WWII (North
Korea). Advancements toward nuclear weaponry
increased after North Korea announced its with-
drawal from the NPT in 2003. The country jus-
tified this move by citing U.S. aggression and
the Bush administration’s pre-emption doctrine,
as declarations of war (Pollack). Efforts by the
international community to reduce North Korea’s
stockpile were unsuccessful. In 2013, North Ko-
rea along with South Korea, Japan, China, Russia,
and the U.S. held talks aimed to denuclearize the
Korean peninsula (North Korea). However, after
disputes with the U.S. over a North Korean rocket
launch, the government voided the discussion and
conducted nuclear tests. Today, the country has an
active nuclear weapons program, and is believed
to possess both a biological and chemical weapons
program. State media has also announced that all
nuclear facilities were functioning to improve the
country’s nuclear stockpile.
Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea’s nu-
clear history is a prime example of how ex-
ternal threats incline countries to adopt nuclear
weaponry. The regional tensions and differences
in military strength pose a serious security is-
sue. These states refuse to rely on nuclear weapon
states for protection. Nuclear nonparty states do
not trust the NPT because they do not see com-
pliance with all state actors. These countries can-
not be sure that nuclear weapon states will protect
them, nor that they will comply with the disar-
mament efforts. Therefore, these countries would
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rather equip themselves with nuclear arms and sta-
bilize their security, as opposed to being a party to
a treaty that infringes on their right to protection.
8. Analysis
After analyzing nuclear party, non-nuclear
party, and nuclear non-party states, it is evident
that the NPT influences each differently. Initially,
the NPT was a way for states to address height-
ened tensions by disarming their nuclear stock-
piles. Since then, the NPT has led to significant
reductions in the world’s nuclear inventory and a
joint effort from nations across the globe to refrain
from nuclear use. However, over time the NPT’s
power over states has diminished.
Nuclear weapon states like Russia have ig-
nored the NPT and admitted to preserving stock-
piles while supporting their country’s moderniza-
tion programs. Superpowers like France and the
U.K. have emphasized their right to use nuclear
force in case of an invasion, attack, or aggression,
leaving opportunity for nuclear use against others
in the international community. Again, this con-
tradicts the NPT’s function within the global sys-
tem. Nonetheless, the nuclear powers continue to
pursue these loopholes, which undoes the progress
made since the Cold War.
The NPT’s influence on non-nuclear weapon
states is also diminishing. The reality is non-
nuclear weapon states are only abiding by the
treaty because they are not facing a current se-
curity threat. States like Brazil and Japan do not
have tense relations like that of the U.S. and Rus-
sia, making their pursuit of nuclear weapons rather
pointless. In addition, some non-nuclear weapon
states like Japan have ensured nuclear protection
from the U.S. with future security threats. This
has also kept them from addressing a nuclear op-
tion. They are abiding by the NPT because they
have ensured their nuclear protection by other
means, i.e. countries who already possess nuclear
weaponry.
Nuclear non-party states are continuing their
weapons programs with little consideration of the
NPT. Israel, Pakistan, India, and now North Ko-
rea continue to explore nuclear capabilities in
the name of national security. These countries
have expressed opposition to the NPT believing
its sole function is to restrict their ability to pro-
tect themselves. India and other non-nuclear party
states have criticized the NPT for not holding nu-
clear weapon states accountable to their obliga-
tions. Overall, the NPT’s influence is not perti-
nent to a non-party states decision to pursue nu-
clear weapons.
There are multiple reasons for why states in-
crease their stockpiles. However, the driving force
in their decision–making process is national secu-
rity. States will decide on whether to pursue nu-
clear weapons, based on whether they currently
face a security threat that calls for it. Countries
that undergo their own “cold war tensions” will
acquire nuclear weapons as a way to even the play-
ing field and secure their countries safety as evi-
denced by the efforts of Israel, India, and Pakistan.
Countries that have not acquired a nuclear
stockpile, like Brazil and Japan, do so because
their current state of security does not dictate the
need for nuclear weaponry. Brazil armed itself
with nuclear weapons after its “cold war tensions”
with Argentina. The two took part in their own
arms race, which made securing a stockpile criti-
cal. However, since their signing of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco and the NPT, tensions between Brazil
and Argentina have decreased. The country no
longer faces a security threat, and no longer feels
the need to arm itself with nuclear weapons. How-
ever, that is not to say that Brazil or other non-
nuclear weapon states will never consider nuclear
weapons. If there is a national security threat,
these states will consider a nuclear option, just as
others have done in the past. This reality is present
in Japan. Though the country has had a devastat-
ing experience with nuclear weapons and is at the
forefront of nonproliferation efforts, Japan still en-
sures its security from North Korea by relying on
the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The lack of
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security threats along with this safety guaranteed
by the U.S. are the only reasons Japan will not pur-
sue a nuclear program today.
Similar to nuclear weapon non-party states
and non-nuclear weapon party states, countries
like the U.S., the U.K., France, Russia, and China
refuse to disarm because of their national secu-
rity. Initially, the NPT functioned to lessen ten-
sions during the Cold War and push for the elimi-
nation of the world’s nuclear stockpile. However,
today tense relations have resurfaced. The U.S.-
Russia relationship has declined. For Russia to
compete with the U.S.’s conventional weapons, it
must maintain whatever is left of its nuclear arse-
nal. Curbing this gap helps secure Russia’s se-
curity against the U.S. Since Russia has admit-
ted to preserving its remaining stockpile, other na-
tions–the U.S., the U.K., France, and China–will
follow suit. The U.S. will maintain and modern-
ize its nuclear weapons because of the threat Rus-
sia poses to U.S. security. The U.K., France, and
China will do the same to avoid relying on the
U.S. and Russia for protection. These nations have
placed their security before fulfilling their NPT
obligations, and in doing so have undone most
the NPT’s progress since the Cold War. Now, the
world has a smaller yet more dangerous nuclear
weapons.
Whether the NPT can prevent countries from
pursuing these nuclear weapons, when external
threats incline them to do so, is debatable. How-
ever, the research implies that it is not likely. Re-
gardless of which countries are in dispute, as long
as national security is threatened, nuclear weapons
will remain an option. Countries will not with-
hold themselves from nuclear weapons if the rest
of the international community is working towards
them. As long as countries feel threatened, nu-
clear weapons will remain a legitimate option for
stability, which contradicts their commitments to
the NPT. Countries like Pakistan, India, and North
Korea will ignore the international community’s
call for a nuclear-free world to guarantee their pro-
tection from the regional threats they face. States
like Japan will comply with the NPT as long as
the U.S. promises protection, otherwise, they may
explore a nuclear option. Lastly, countries like
the U.S. and Russia will continue to maintain
and modernize existing stockpiles for security pur-
poses and argue that modernization does not out-
right violate the NPT.
This leads one to question whether a world
free of nuclear arms is achievable under the NPT.
Although the international community had inten-
tions to reduce and dissolve the world of nuclear
weapons, the treaty no longer has the same power
on states. The NPT does not provide effective
solutions against countries gaining and preserve
nuclear arms. At the time of its creation, writ-
ers of the NPT did not foresee modernization as
an option for states. The goal was to reduce
U.S.-Soviet Union tensions and push for the to-
tal elimination of nuclear weapons. Since the
NPT does not address modernization, states can
continue to do so while arguing that there is no
NPT violation. In addition, the NPT lacks speci-
ficity in its obligations. The treaty requires nuclear
weapon states to disarm at an “early date,” giv-
ing them room to argue for as much time as they
please. These weaknesses within the treaty have
fueled disputes among the international commu-
nity especially over the lack of commitment ex-
hibited by nuclear party states. Instead of disman-
tling stockpiles further, these states are advancing
their weaponry, which will only ignite tensions
among other states. These rising tensions will lead
to more countries pursuing nuclear weapons pro-
grams and decrease the number of countries will-
ing to follow the guidelines and goals of the NPT.
9. Conclusion
The reality of the NPT and its influence on the
international community remains consistent with
the realist perspective. The realist perspective re-
lies on the fact that states will always prioritize
their security since doing so reflects rational be-
havior. Today, nuclear weapon states are preserv-
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ing their existing stockpiles and making them dan-
gerous for the sake of security. Realists also ar-
gue that states will never disarm because doing
so is irrational. This is evident in the nuclear
weapons states inability to disarm further than
they already have. These states want to maintain
a level of competitive warfare to ensure their exis-
tence against rivaling states.
Realist perspective argues that the NPT has
created a hierarchical system where some states
have permission to explore their nuclear capa-
bilities while restricting access to others. States
have contended the imbalance in regulating nu-
clear weapon states. Nuclear weapon states can
continue such programs whilst the international
community debates over the legitimacy of such
actions under the NPT. Regardless of the obvi-
ous contradiction among nuclear weapon states
and the NPT, the U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and
China continue to preserve and modernize stock-
piles.
The liberal perspective argues that the NPT
will work because countries are looking to avoid
nuclear war. They contend that avoiding nuclear
war falls in line with maintaining national security
and therefore is in their best interest. Construc-
tivists argue that the NPT’s influence depends on
how state actors give meaning to it. Each of these
approaches requires all states to comply with the
obligations set forth in the NPT. Otherwise, if one
state opts for a nuclear program, other countries,
especially those that find the nuclear state a threat,
will push for their own program.
Today, states have neglected their responsibil-
ities to the NPT for the sake of national secu-
rity. States that comply with the NPT, only do
so because they do not face a threat to security.
However, given certain circumstances, these coun-
tries are not compelled by the NPT to consider
non-nuclear options. This security-driven focus
aligns with the realist theory, further illustrating
this school of thought as the most accurate in ad-
dressing the present function and effectiveness of
the NPT on the international community.
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